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Several explanations for the observed limited stock market participation have been oﬀered in
the literature. One of the most promising one is the presence of market frictions mostly in the
form of ﬁxed entry and/or transaction costs. Empirical studies strongly point to a signiﬁcant
structural (state) dependence in the the stock market entry decision, which is consistent with
costs of these types. However, the magnitude of these costs are not yet known.
This paper focuses on ﬁxed stock market entry costs. I set up a structural estimation
procedure which involves solving and simulating a life cycle intertemporal portfolio choice model
augmented with a ﬁxed stock market entry cost. Important features of household portfolio data
(from the PSID) are matched to their simulated counterparts. Utilizing a Simulated Minimum
Distance estimator, I estimate the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, the discount factor and
the stock market entry cost. Given the equity premium and the calibrated income process, I
estimate a one-time entry cost of approximately 2 percent of (annual) permanent income. My
estimated model matches the zero median holding as well as the hump-shaped age-participation
proﬁle observed in the data.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent empirical evidence suggests that, in any developed country, at least ﬁfty percent of house-
holds do not hold equities directly or indirectly (through mutual funds, retirement accounts etc.)1.
Furthermore, the median age of entry into the stock market is quite high (around forty ﬁve). Given
t h er a t h e ri m p r e s s i v ee q u i t yp r e m i u mo v e rt h el a s tn i n e t yy e a r st h e s ef a c t sa r ed i ﬃcult to reconcile
with the standard intertemporal portfolio choice model. Although we began to see a substantial
increase in stock market participation and much more sophisticated household portfolio structures
over the 1990s, the observed aversion to stockholding and diﬀerences in participation patterns across
households even after controlling for age, income, wealth and education still pose a great challenge to
the life cycle model2.A m o n gs e v e r a le x p l a n a t i o n so ﬀered in the literature, the emerging consensus
seems to be some sort of perceived "stock market entry cost" typically in the form of time cost of
information acquisition for the new entrants.
Most studies in the literature present evidence regarding the presence of an entry cost without in-
ferring its magnitude (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002 and Guiso et al 2002). A few use simulation techniques
to illustrate the potential size of the entry cost necessary to generate complete non-participation for
diﬀerent preference parameters (Haliassos and Bertaut 1997, Polkovnichenko 2001 and Haliassos and
Michaelides 2003). While convincing, none of these studies attempts to quantify entry cost within
a complete structural estimation framework. Naturally, the magnitude of such a cost cannot be
estimated within a reduced form setting. This paper takes an important step forward in identifying
ﬁxed stock market entry costs by reconciling a fairly rich version of the standard life cycle portfolio
choice model with observed participation patterns. In doing so, I estimate the stock market entry
cost and intertemporal allocation parameters; the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the dis-
count factor. In terms of novelty, this study is the ﬁrst attempt to quantify the economic magnitude
of the one-time stock market entry cost by accounting for observed "limited participation" within a
complete structural setting under income and return uncertainty.
Costs that deter entry in the stock market may take several forms. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
1Sweden has the highest indirect stock holding (54% in 1999) followed by the U.S. (48% in 1998) See Guiso et al
(2002).
2For instance in 1998 only 19% of the American households were holding equity directly in publicly traded corpo-
rations. This number is the highest (27%) for the UK among all developed nations. See Bertaut (1998) and Guiso et
al (2002).
2categorizes participation costs as ﬁxed entry costs, ﬁxed and variable transaction costs and per period
trading costs. She points to symptoms of strong structural (state) dependence in participation and
stock holding decisions as evidence of ﬁxed entry and transaction costs and she estimates per period
trading costs3. Structural dependence in participation manifests itself by making participation in a
given period more likely if the household participated in the previous period. Using panel data on
household indirect stockholding she ﬁnds that lagged participation is a very signiﬁcant determinant
of current participation. Another related study by Guiso et al (2002) presents cross-country evidence
on the presence of participation costs. In their detailed descriptive work, they conclude that the
cross-country diﬀerences in participation rates can be better justiﬁed by diﬀerent institutional and
informational barriers to entry across countries than diﬀerences in stock returns.
As far as quantifying ﬁxed entry costs is concerned, a study of a particular importance is Haliassos
and Michaelides (2003). Rather than estimating the magnitude of the entry cost, they simulate a
stochastic portfolio choice model and then for diﬀerent structural parameters they calculate the entry
cost required to keep all agents out of the stock market. However, they did not consider life cycle
participation proﬁles. Instead, they adopt an inﬁnite life setting where the delayed entry observed
in the data cannot be modelled. To my knowledge, Faria (2000) is the only study that estimates
ﬁxed entry cost. However, he uses an inﬁnite life general equilibrium model with no equity or labor
income risk. Naturally, his results are extremely sensitive to the equity premium assumed.
The entry cost considered in this paper is a one time fee; a ﬁrst time investor must pay to
participate in the stock market and it has a very broad deﬁnition. Simply, it can be thought of as
the value of time spent to understand the basic functioning of stock markets, to learn how to follow
price movements, how to trade, how to assess risk and return relationship for an optimal portfolio
choice, etc. Since I think of this as a time cost incurred to acquire information, and hence related
to the opportunity cost of time (the wage), it is plausible to formulate this cost as proportional to
permanent income 4. It is important to note that this fee is paid (if ever paid) only once over the
3Participation costs that do not create structural state dependence (per period trading costs) can be inferred within
a reduced form setting. Costs, on the other hand, that create correlation of participation or stock holding decisions
across periods (entry costs, ﬁxed and variable transaction costs) can only be identiﬁed with a structural estimation.
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) concludes that a per period transaction cost of as low as $50 can explain the choices of half
of non-participants. Paiela (2001) estimates per period cost bounds in terms of forgone utility gains and ﬁnds that at
least $31 is needed to generate the observed participation pattern for a consumer with log utility.
4This assumption turns out to be necessary in order to make our estimation strategy feasible. With this simlifying
but justiﬁable assumption, the number of state variables is reduced.
3entire life cycle. Once it is paid, the household is free to re-enter the stock market (if exited some
time after entry) without incurring any further cost; once learned, such knowledge is not forgotten
for the rest of the life cycle5. In my empirical work below, I provide some evidence on the plausibility
of this assumption.
The estimation involves matching the age-proﬁle (corrected for cohort eﬀects and family size)
and structural dependence in participation observed in the U. S. Panel Data of Income Dynamics
(PSID) with their simulated counterparts. To do so, I use a Simulated Minimum Distance (SMD)
estimator. I match some carefully selected auxiliary statistics (parameters of an auxiliary model).
Using a probit regression as my auxiliary model, I estimate the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
and subjective discount rate to be 1.625 and 0.0874 respectively. The stock market entry cost
is estimated to be 2.15 percent of annual permanent income. All parameters are estimated with
considerable precision. Although the overidentiﬁcation restrictions are rejected, the estimates of
the intertemporal allocation parameters are within the range of previous estimates in the literature.
Moreover, the simulated participation proﬁles (based on the estimated parameters) seem to be in
line with the actual proﬁles, and the estimated model matches the structural dependence in the
data.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 I lay out a structural life-cycle
model of portfolio choice. I also numerically solve and simulate the model at some illustrative
parameter values, in order to demonstrate the potential eﬀects of a stock market entry cost. I then
turn to the structural estimation of the model. The data I use for estimation are described in Section
3, and the estimation method is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents my results. Section 6
concludes.
5In the standard life cycle setting the only reason to exit the stock market is to ﬁnance consumption. A buﬀer
stock saver may have to liquidiate his shares if he gets hit by an adverse income shock that leaves him with insuﬃcient
cash on hand to aﬀord his optimal consumption.
42 The Model
2.1 A Basic Life-Cycle Model of Portfolio Choice
I assume that the expected utility function is intertemporally additive over a ﬁnite life time and the













where C is non-durable consumption (separable from durable consumption), γ is coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, δ is rate of time preference. I assume that the end of working life T is certain6.
Following Deaton (1991), I deﬁne endogenous state variable cash on hand as the sum of ﬁnancial
assets and labor income and it evolves as follows:
Xt+1 =( 1+re
t+1)St +( 1+r)Bt + Yt+1 (2)
where re
t+1 is stochastic return from the risky asset representing the stock market, r is the risk-free
rate which can be thought of as bonds, T-bills and bank accounts, St is the amount of wealth
invested in the risky asset, Bt is the amount of wealth invested in the risk-free asset. Following
Carroll (1992) Yt+1 is stochastic labor income which follows the exogenous stochastic process:
Yt+1 = Pt+1Ut+1 (3)
Pt+1 = Gt+1PtNt+1 (4)
Permanent income Pt grows at the rate Gt and it is subject to multiplicative iid shocks Nt. Current
income Yt is composed of a permanent and a transitory component Ut. Further details regarding
income processes is given below.
Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002) I deﬁne a retirement value function so that the con-
sumption rule at the time of retirement is
CT = λ1(XT+1 + HT+1) (5)
where λ1 is marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, and HT+1 is exogenously accumulated
illiquid wealth, which is modelled proportional to the last permanent income hPT. This assumption
6It would be straight forward to incorporate a stochastic mortality into the model. This additional complex-
ity though is not likely to contribute signiﬁcantly to the estimation results. This argument is especially stronger
considering I am interestred only in working life at this point.
5leads to positive wealth at the time of retirement. I do not consider retirement years or explicitly
model a bequest motive.
The excess return on the risky asset is assumed to be iid:
re
t+1 − r = µ + εt+1 (6)
where µ is the mean excess return and εt+1 is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ2
ε. A
positive correlation between return and permanent income shocks along with shortsale constraints
also generates delayed entry since such a correlation leads to a hedging demand for the riskless asset.
However, the empirical evidence for the existence of such a correlation is rather weak. Heaton and
Lucas (2000a) ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant correlation between stock returns and intrapreneurial income
(around 0.2) but small and insigniﬁcant values for other occupation groups. Estimates obtained by
Davis and Willen (2000) range between 0.1 to 0.3 for a college educated group and signiﬁcantly
negative for a lower education group. Since such a correlation is not strongly evident in the data I
choose to set it to zero, both in my illustrative simulations and in my estimation procedure.
The maximization problem involves using the Bellman equation and solving the recursive equa-
tion via backward induction. The problem is:








t+1)St +( 1+r)Bt + Yt+1,P t+1,H t+1
¤¾
(7)
subject to shortsale and borrowing constraints,
St ≥ 0,B t ≥ 0
where Vt(.) denotes the value function.
In order to make the estimation computationally feasible I normalize the necessary variables
by dividing them by permanent income (see Carroll 1992). By doing this, I reduce the number of
endogenous state variables to one, namely, ratio of cash on hand to permanent income. The resulting









t+1)st +( 1+r)st/Gt+1Nt+1 + Ut+1
¤¾
(8)
where xt = Xt
Pt ,s t = St
Pt,b t = bt
Pt and ct = Ct
Pt = xt − st − bt.
6Normalized consumption at the ﬁnal period is:
cT = λ0 + λ1xT (9)
where λ0 = hλ1. In order to obtain the policy rules for the earlier periods I deﬁne a grid for the
endogenous state variable x and maximize the above equation for every point in the grid. Value and
policy functions are approximated with cubic splines.
2.2 Adding a Stock Market Entry Cost
I now assume that participating in the stock market requires an entry fee, whereas investing in the
risk-free asset is costless. When augmented with the ﬁxed entry cost, the solution of the above
model requires additional computations. The optimizing agent now has to decide whether to enter
into stock market or not before he decides how to allocate his wealth. This is done by comparing
the discounted expected future value of participation and that of nonparticipation in every period.
This results in the following optimization problems:
Vt(xt,I t)=m a x
0,1
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xt+1 =( 1+r)bt/Gt+1Nt+1 + Ut+1 (12)
where It is a binary variable representing participation at time t. V 0(xt,I t) is the value the consumer
gets by not participating regardless of whether he has participated in the previous period or not,
i.e. exit from the stock market is assumed to be costless.












t+1)st +( 1+r)bt − Ec¤
/Gt+1Nt+1 + Ut+1 (14)
V 1(xt,I t) is the value consumer gets by participating. The entry cost is proportional to current
permanent income (PtEc). The parameter Ec is ﬁxed and it is 0 if the agent is already participated
7once in the stock market and it is positive if he has never participated before. It is important to
note that, like exit, re-entry is costless.
In each time period, given his current participation state, the agent ﬁrst decides whether to enter
the stock market or not (or stay if he is already in) by comparing the expected discounted value of
each decision. Then, conditional on participation, he decides how much wealth to allocate to the
risky asset. If he chooses not to participate, the only saving instrument is the risk-free asset which
has a constant return r. The details of the solution method are given in Appendix A.
2.3 Illustrative Simulations
Solution and simulation of the standard portfolio choice model under labor income uncertainty
(i.e., without a participation cost) is well described in the literature7. To illustrate the potential
eﬀect of a ﬁxed stock market entry cost on consumption, investment and participation decisions, I
solve the model with and without an entry cost for 50 years. I then simulate the life cycle paths
of consumption, investment in risky and riskless assets and participation. The parameter values
assumed for this simulation exercise are given in Table 1.
To solve and simulate the model, I need the income process. For the purpose of these simulations,
I assume that the growth rate of income is nonstochastic and G =1 8. I also assume that the transitory
shocks Ut are distributed independently and identically, take the value of zero with some small
but positive probability and otherwise lognormal such that ln(Ut) ∼ N(−0.5σ2
u ,σ2
u). Similarly,
permanent shocks Nt are iid and ln(Nt) ∼ N(−0.5σ2
n ,σ2
n). Assuming that the innovations to
income are independent over time and across individuals I assume away aggregate shocks to income.
However, aggregate shocks are not completely eliminated from the model since all agents face the
same return process.
Introducing zero income risk into the life cycle model is motivated by Carroll (1992) and adapted
by Gourinchas and Parker (2002). This assumption has important implications for optimal behavior.
Given the fact that iso-elastic utility function yields inﬁnite marginal utility of consumption at zero
consumption, backward induction dictates that a consumer who faces such a risk optimally chooses
never to borrow. Thus, consumer saves at every level of wealth and more importantly, the Euler
7See Cocco et al (1997) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2002).
8Note that tis assumption is only for these illustrative simulations. When I turn to structural estimation of the
model, although I continue to assume nonstochastic income growth, I use estimated age-growth rate proﬁles.
8equation is always satisﬁed. Although the characterization of the model is presented with this zero
income probability assumption, estimation of the structural parameters is performed by assuming a
Deaton-type explicit borrowing constraint.
The panels in Figure 1 display the policy function diﬀerences for diﬀerent stages of life. The
ﬁgures are obtained by simply subtracting policy functions from the model with an entry cost from
policy functions from the model without an entry cost. The ﬁrst two panels show the eﬀect of entry
cost on optimal stock holding at very old and very young ages respectively9. At young ages, optimal
stock holding in the presence of an entry cost is lower for all cash on hand levels. The diﬀerence
is quite large at the lower wealth levels where the consumer is still out of the stock market as he
cannot aﬀord to pay the entry cost. The wedge becomes much smaller after stock market entry
occurs although the amount of wealth invested in the stock market is still lower than it is without
entry cost. Interestingly, at older ages entry does not take place as soon as it is aﬀordable. The
consumer decides to participate in the stock market only if he has considerable accumulated wealth
since his investment horizon is not long enough to take advantage of the equity premium. As can
be seen in panel 1 of Figure 1, entry takes place only at a very high cash on hand level (note the
s h a r pd r o pi nd i ﬀerences) and stock holding after the entry is lower than it is without entry cost.
Not surprisingly, policy function diﬀerences for bond holding are qualitatively the reverse of that
for stock holding (panels 3 and 4). At very young ages, optimal bond holding in the presence of
entry cost is much higher at low wealth levels since it is the only investment tool available to a
consumer who cannot yet aﬀord the entry cost. With an entry cost, bond holding remains slightly
higher even after the stock market entry takes place. At old ages total bond holding at the very
high wealth levels is very large under an entry cost - so much so that total investment (stocks plus
bonds) under an entry cost is higher.
The last two panels illustrate the eﬀect of entry cost on consumption functions. At very young
ages, optimal consumption is lower (reﬂecting higher saving) if the consumer does not face any entry
cost (diﬀerence is negative). After the entry takes place the diﬀerence is not as big although it is
still negative. The diﬀerence between consumption functions presents a very interesting pattern for
older ages (panel 5). At the very low wealth levels, we observe no diﬀerence, at middle levels (still no
9Note that this a ﬁnite life model where policy rules are functions of age as well as cash on hand. The solution of
the model for 50 periods results in 50 diﬀerent policy rules for stocks, bonds and consumption. See Appendix A for
the details of the solution method.
9entry) consumption under entry cost is higher (or total investment is lower). As wealth accumulates,
although stock holding is still lower, bond holding becomes so high that total investment in the model
with an entry cost becomes higher. This in turn leads to higher consumption growth.
The implications of entry cost for consumption and saving can be illustrated more clearly com-
paring the life cycle paths of consumption, bond and stock holding. Panels 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 2
display the diﬀerence in life cycle paths. Using the policy functions and random income and return
draws, 10,000 ex-ante identical paths are generated with and without entry cost. Figures are ob-
tained by subtracting average paths from the model with an entry cost from those from model with
no entry cost. The last panel shows the life cycle participation paths with and without an entry cost
(note the diﬀerence between them).
At young ages, consumption without entry cost is naturally low as consumers accumulate wealth
through aggressive stock holding. As wealth is accumulated, higher consumption is enjoyed. However
at very old ages and high wealth levels, higher stock holding in the absence of entry cost leads to
lower consumption levels. At older ages, consumers are better oﬀ with lower stock holding and higher
bond holding since that means a lower correlation between aggregate risk and consumption. Life
cycle path of stock holding/bond holding under entry cost is strictly lower/higher. The diﬀerences
are sharper at older ages leading to a hump shaped diﬀerence in life cycle consumption paths.
The last panel of Figure 2 shows the life cycle path of participation with and without entry cost.
It is obvious that the standard model without entry cost has no hope of matching the participation
pattern observed in the data since the model predicts participation at every stage of the life cycle.
The implied mean participation is much higher than those observed in the data. More speciﬁcally,
the model without entry cost implies 100% participation rate at all ages while the model augmented
with only 1 percent entry cost implies a hump shaped participation proﬁle with about 70 percent
mean participation rate at prime ages.
I now turn to the structural estimation of the model with an entry cost, beginning with a
discussion of the data.
103D a t a
The proposed estimation procedure necessitates the use of panel data on portfolio composition. I use
the PSID wealth supplements conducted in 1984 and 1989. To make the sample more representative,
the original census sample and the Latino sample are excluded.10 Nevertheless, the sample I use
for estimation is not fully representative of the US population since I exclude split up families to
create a two-period panel. Moreover, the sample includes only households that reported all necessary
demographic information; family size, race, age, and marital status as well as their portfolio choices
for both years. Female headed households and black households are excluded. Because I do not
explicitly model retirement years, a bequest motive or educational choices, I take only households
whose heads were older than 24 in 1984 and younger than 60 in 1989. Students and retirees are
also excluded. The ﬁnal sample has 1294 households. Participation statistics for the full and ﬁnal
(estimation) samples are presented in Table 1. More general facts regarding household portfolios in
the U.S. are well documented by a number of researchers including Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and
Guiso et al (2002).
Because the estimation method requires simulating data from the underlying structural model
and since the structural model I use is rather time consuming to solve, I focus on estimating only
the entry cost and intertemporal allocation parameters. The parameters of the income and asset
return processes used in the estimations are calibrated.
Income process parameters required to implement my estimation procedure are the average age-
income growth proﬁle, and the variances of the permanent and transitory components of labor
income. To estimate these parameters for each education group I follow Carroll and Samwick
(1997). I estimate income process parameters for the sample period covering 1981-1992 (12 years).
Income data in the PSID refers to previous year’s income. I deﬁne non-ﬁnancial income broadly
enough to account for possible insurance schemes available to households, such as unemployment
insurance and social assistance. Total household nonﬁnancial income is total labor income plus
unemployment insurance, workers compensation, social security, supplemental social security, child
support, the value of food stamps and some other transfers. Real income data are calculated using
the Consumer Price Index. Following Carroll and Samwick (1997) I assume an income process that
10Although wealth data is also available in 1994, my structural estimation only employs the 1984 and 1989 data
because I have access to income data only until 1992.
11can be decomposed into permanent and transitory components. The logarithm of permanent income
pi







t is the logarithm of permanent income of ith individual in period t, gi
t is income growth
(likely to be a function of individual characteristics and demographics) and zi
t is mean zero iid shocks
with variance σ2
z.









t are mean zero iid transitory shocks with variance σ2
ε.
First, I estimate the average age-income growth proﬁle by simply regressing income growth
on occupation, industry dummies, age, age- squared, age cubed, race, marital status, and family
size. Estimated average age-income growth proﬁles are obtained by taking the predicted values
from this regression and calculating age-speciﬁc averages. Predictable income growth has important
implications for household portfolio composition. If an individual expects high income growth,
depending on the other parameters of his utility function, he may want to borrow against his future
income when young if he is not facing borrowing constraints. In my setting, borrowing against future
labor income is not allowed.
Second, I estimate the error structure of the income process described above. For this, ﬁrst, I
regress the logarithm of real income on age dummies, marital status, family size and race. Then
Ic o n s t r u c td i ﬀerenced regression residuals. I deﬁne (following the notation and the procedure of
Carroll and Samwick 1997)
ri
d = Y i
t+d − Y i
t (17)













12I combine all possible series of Va r(rd) and d and regress Va r(rd) on a constant and d for each
education group. The results are presented in Table 311.
I use value weighted and dividend adjusted annual returns on NYSE and AMEX between 1950−
1992. Return and risk-free rate data were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Annual inﬂation series (to calculate real returns) were obtained
from the U. S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistic. Years were chosen so that the oldest
household head in 1984 data (56 years of age) was at the age of 22 in 1950. The mean equity
premium calculated is 6% with the standard deviation of 17%. The model is solved using these two
empirical moments of the return distribution. In order to generate simulated paths I use realized
returns. The risk-free rate is calculated by taking the mean of the real annual 3-month T- Bill rate
(3%).
Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002), the retirement value function parameters λ0 and λ1are
set to be 0.001 and 0.71 respectively.
The model presented in the previous section assumes that the stock market entry cost is paid, at
most, once over the life-cycle: stock market re-entry is costless. Moreover, if the entry cost is a one
time cost, it is most natural to think of it as an information cost, which in turn makes modelling
it as proportional to permanent income attractive (because the opportunity cost of information
acquisition depends on the wage.) Fortunately, I can perform a simple empirical test to asses the
plausibility of costless re-entry. It is now possible to observe the portfolios of the PSID households
in 3 diﬀerent time periods (1984,1989 and 1994). Participation in 1989 is a good predictor of
participation in 1994 (this is the structural dependence reported in the literature.) However, if the
entry cost is a one time cost, then participation in 1989 should have no eﬀect on participation in
1994 among those households that participated in 1984. Empirically, this turns out to be the case.12
4 Estimation Method
4.1 Simulated Minimum Distance
I employ a simulation based estimation technique. Hall and Rust (1999) refer to the general tech-
nique as Simulated Minimum Distance (SMD) since it is based on matching (minimizing the distance
11In Table 3 I only report average income growth. For the estimations, the model is solved and simulated with the
age speciﬁci n c o m eg r o w t hr a t e s .
12Full results on of this analysis are available upon request.
13between) statistics from the data with statistics from a simulated model. The class of SMD estima-
tors includes the EMM procedure of Gallant and Tauchen (1996) and the Indirect Inference methods
of Gouriéroux, Monfort and Renault (1993). Here I present a short account of the method as applied
generally to panel data; see Hall and Rust (1999) and Alvarez et al (2003) for further details.
Suppose that we observe h =1 ,2..H cross section units over t =1 ,2...T periods and we wish to
model variable Y with a set of explanatory variables X. Thus we have panel data on H agents. In my
case Y contains the participation indicator. For modelling we assume that Y given X is identically
and independently distributed over units with the parametric conditional distribution F (Yh|Xh;θ),
where θ is an m-vector of parameters.13 If this distribution is tractable enough we could derive a
likelihood function and use either maximum likelihood estimation or simulated maximum likelihood
estimation (if the distribution is diﬃcult to integrate). Alternatively, with some moment conditions
of this distribution for observables we use GMM to recover estimates of θ. In the cases where
integration is analytically infeasible we can use SMD if we can simulate Yh given the observed Xh
and parameters for the model. Thus we choose a integer S for the number of replications and then
generate S ∗ H simulated outcomes
©
(Y 1
1 ,X 1),...(Y 1
H,X H),(Y 2




of course, depend on the model chosen (F (.)) and the value of θ t a k e ni nt h em o d e l .
Thus we have some actual data on H agents for T periods and some simulated data on S∗H units
that have the same form. The next step is to choose a value for the parameters which minimizes the
distance between some features of the real data and the same features of the simulated data. To do
this, we ﬁrst choose a set of auxiliary statistics that are used for matching and obtain them using the
data in hand. The natural question is: which statistics? Gallant and Tauchen (1996) suggest ﬁrst
ﬁnding a ‘score generator’ (ﬂexible quasi-likelihood function) w h i c hn e s t st h et r u em o d e l ,a n dt h e n
using the score vector from this as auxiliary parameters. In the Gouriéroux et al. (1993) Indirect
Inference procedure, the auxiliary parameters are maximizers of a given data dependent criterion
which constitutes an approximation to the true DGP. Both of these approaches are motivated by
attempts to derive estimators that have eﬃciency properties that are close to MLE. In Hall and
Rust (1999), the auxiliary parameters are simply statistics that describe important aspects of the
data. For now I disregard the eﬃciency issues and follow this approach.
13This could be generalised to allow for dependence on the initial values of the Y variables, as in Alvarez et al.
(2003).
14The estimation method amounts to choosing J sample auxiliary parameters αD
j (Yh,X h) where
J > m so that we have at least as many auxiliary parameters as structural parameters. These are
simple statistics of the data. Denote J-vector of auxiliary parameters derived from data by αD. The
general assumption is that sample auxiliary parameters have a mean and covariance under the true
distribution. The vector of population auxiliary parameters are deﬁned as
α0(θ)=E0(αD(Yh,X h)) (20)
where E0 denotes expectation with respect to the true distribution. Assuming independence across
cross-section units we have
plimαD(Yh,X h)=α0(θ) (21)
so that αD(Yh,X h) is a consistent estimator for α0(θ). The true covariance matrix for the auxiliary
parameters is denoted by V0(θ). In the estimations I shall use a bootstrap estimator for this and
denote it by Vb. The assumption here is that the bootstrap gives a consistent estimate of V0 as
H →∞ .
Same statistics can be calculated S times using the simulated data where the DGP is the sto-









h,X h) is a set of H simulated path conditional on Xh and on the initial values in the
observed data. Assume that αS(θ) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and the model is well-speciﬁed









Identiﬁcation requires that the Jacobian of the mapping from model parameters to auxiliary para-





= m with probability 1 (25)
15Given sample and simulated auxiliary parameters I take a J × J positive deﬁnite matrix A and
deﬁne the SMD estimator:
ˆ θSMD =a r gm i n
θ
¡




αS(θ) − αD(Yh,X h)
¢
(26)
under the assumption that θ is contained in a compact set and the diﬀerentiability assumption on





rank and globally unique if αS(θ) is one-one.
4.2 Choice of Auxiliary Parameters
In general, the number of potential auxiliary statistics can be larger than the model parameters.
For instance, it is plausible to match second, third, even fourth moments, and all cross moments, in
which case the estimation procedure provides an opportunity to test the overidentifying restrictions.
Naturally, the use of the correct weighting matrix becomes relevant if one proceeds with this strategy.
However, the monte carlo experiments performed by Alvarez et al. (2003), suggest that SMD
estimators do not perform well in environments where we have large numbers of overidentifying
restrictions.
I use a simple auxiliary model to generate auxiliary statistics. In particular, my auxiliary statistics
are the constant and coeﬃcients on age, age- squared, and lagged participation, in a linear probability
model or probit for stock market participation. I chose this approach for two reasons. First, it
connects my auxiliary statistics to the existing reduced form literature. Second, with this approach
Ih a v eo n l y1 overidentifying restriction (whereas if I matched the entire age-proﬁle, I would have
many over-identifying restrictions).
The speciﬁcation of the linear probability model is:
It = α0 + α1Aget + α2Age2
t + α3It−1 + α4FSt +
8 X
i=1
βiCohorti +  t (27)
where It denotes participation status, FSt denotes family size in period t. T h ei n d e xo ft h ep r o b i t
model is speciﬁe di nt h es a m ew a y .
When constructing age-participation proﬁles it is particularly important to adjust for cohort
eﬀects for two reasons. First, diﬀerent cohorts may have diﬀerent participation attitudes and this
will not be represented in the simulated data. For example if the earlier cohorts did not know much
16about the stock market or if they had a particular dislike for risky investments, the estimated age-
participation proﬁle will have a spurious decline at older ages. Second, earlier cohorts may have had
lower initial wealth and, consequently, lower stock market participation rate. This may also cause
a bias in the estimated proﬁles by, again, pushing the proﬁles down at older ages. Note that the
omitted cohort dummy is for the middle (5th of 9) cohort.
After estimating the equation above I take the coeﬃcients α0,α 1,α 2,α 3 as auxiliary parameters.
Since the focus of this paper is to estimate the entry cost, the choice of the auxiliary parameter that
identiﬁes it deserves a particular attention. It is now well known that the presence of a ﬁxed entry
cost leads to structural dependence in participation decision. Hence, a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on past
participation (α3) seems to be a natural choice to identify the entry cost. If the entry cost were
zero, participation in any given period would be independent of participation in the previous period
and this coeﬃcient would be statistically not diﬀerent from zero. I performed a simulation check to
establish the relationship between this coeﬃcient and the structural entry cost parameter and found
a strong monotone relationship over a wide range of entry cost values14.
A possible concern here is that the structural dependence in the data is the spurious result of
unobserved heterogeneity.15 I require a method deal with these eﬀects in the auxiliary estimations
since the same eﬀects are not present in the simulated data. For dynamic panel data models Heck-
man (1981) proposes an approximate random eﬀect estimator to remove (or diminish) the eﬀect of
unobserved heterogeneity. This estimator can be used for T =2or higher and its bias is not as
big as the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. The estimator assumes that individual eﬀects are not correlated
with the right hand side variables other than the lagged variable. This is a plausible assumption
for the auxiliary model I use in the paper since I do not include moments of labor income in the
participation equation. These variables would be very likely to be correlated with unobserved indi-
vidual eﬀects16. The estimation method amounts to specifying participation for both periods 1984
and 1989 separately where the equation for 1989 has 1984’s participation as an additional regressor,
14The relationship displays a concave structure in general. However, it is not possible to obtain a sensible relationship
for very large entry cost values due to computational reasons. At very large values, there is simply no entry and the
relationship is not deﬁned.
15Note that the inclusion of cohort dummies in the speciﬁcation means that the coeﬃcients on age and age-squared
are estimated using longitudinal variation in age (because cohort is collinear with cross-sectional variation in mean
age.) Thus concern arising from the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity is limited to the coeﬃcient on lagged
participation.
16Since the purpose of the paper is to match the age proﬁles and the structural dependence in stock market
participation, these variables can be left out as long as they are left out in both actual and the simulated data.
17and allowing for correlation in errors across two equations.17,18
4.3 Initial Conditions
Because I do not observe all households at the beginning of their life cycle (24 years of age) I
need to estimate an initial wealth distribution to initiate simulations. For this, I use a sample of
households whose head is between 24 and 28 years of age and ﬁt a lognormal distribution to the
empirical distribution of the ratio of wealth to permanent income. Wealth is the sum of ﬁnancial
and real assets and permanent income is the predicted value obtained from the regression of labor
income on household characteristics, and occupation, education and industry dummies. The mean
of the logarithm of the wealth to permanent income ratio is estimated to be −3.15 and the standard
deviation 1.96. In the simulation part of the estimation procedure every household begins its working
life by drawing an initial wealth to permanent income ratio from this distribution. Furthermore,
initial permanent income is normalized to 1. Although it is quite common for young households
to start their working life with debt, I do not allow for borrowing in the current setting. Thus the
lognormal initial wealth distribution is appropriate.
4.4 Estimation in Practice
The structural estimation involves a grid search over three parameters: the coeﬃcient of risk aversion,
discount rate and the entry cost. Other parameters: income variance, income growth, return process
parameters and the risk free rate are calibrated. Steps in the estimation procedure are as follows:
1. Obtain the necessary sample auxiliary parameters from the data: These are the ﬁrst four
coeﬃcients of the participation regression (equation 27).
2. Obtain the variance-covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameters through a panel data boot-
strap procedure.
17See Vissing-Jorgensen 2002 for the details of this estimator.
18Alternatively, one could adopt a more structural approach and estimate a heterogenous model where typically, a
parametric distribution is assumed for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion instead of imposing a single parameter
for everyone. In such a case we would estimate the moments of the assumed distribution. This approach is used
in Alan and Browning (2003) for the estimation of heterogenous discount factor. Unfortunately, I cannot follow the
same route in this paper since I do not have suﬃciently long panel data on portfolio composition. Such estimation
requires construction of auxiliary statistics for each individual in the actual data. The resulting empirical distribution
of individual statistics would be used to identify the structural distribution of the parameter of interest. With 2
observations per individual, this is not possible.
183. Solve the underlying structural model and simulate participation paths that imitate the data
patterns (the age composition and the panel structure of the sample). Obtain simulated
auxiliary parameters by estimating a participation equation on the simulated data (a probit
relating current participation to age, age- squared and participation lagged ﬁve periods).
4. Minimize the distance between the simulated and actual data auxiliary parameters using the
bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix as the weighting matrix.
Exact imitation of the panel data in hand when simulating ﬁctitious households is extremely
crucial in the estimation procedure. Remember two important features of the real data. First,
households are observed at diﬀerent ages in only two points in time. A 35 year old observed in
1984 is re-observed in 1989 as a 40 year old. Since I do not observe his wealth at the age of 24, I
draw a random number from the estimated initial wealth distribution and simulate his participation
path up until he is 40. Then, I take his participation status for the age of 35 and 40 only. I repeat
this for all 35 year olds (however many they are) in the sample. The procedure performs the same
simulation and selection technique for all age groups. At the end, I obtain the exact age composition
of the actual data with 5-year apart panel structure.
Second, the observed data does not reveal the actual participation path19. For example, a
household who did not participate in 1984 may have participated in 1985 and if he did not participate
in 1989 (when I re-observe him) he is recorded as a complete non-participant. Situations similar to
this may cause underestimation of the entry cost. By replicating the exact structure of the data,
I hope to address this problem. Note that the same situation can arise in the simulated data.
Depending on the initial condition and income realizations, a household may: never participate;
participate sometime but not be observed while participating; participate sometime and be observed
participating in both years or in one of the years; or it may participate all along. It should be
reemphasized that as long as the problems of the real data are replicated in the simulated data SMD
estimator is consistent20. This ability of the SMD estimator to overcome complicated sampling and
selection issues in the real data simply by replicating the sampling and selection procedures on the
simulated data is very big feature of this method.
19I thank Gregor Smith for raising this important point.
20The implicit assumption here is that the probability of each path occuring is the same in both simulated and the
actual data. Unfortunately, this assumption is not possible to test.
19Turning to estimation, after deﬁning grids for all three parameters I calculate the criterion
function for every point in the grid keeping other parameters ﬁxed. I initially deﬁne 20 grid points
for the risk aversion coeﬃcient, 20 for the discount rate and 30 points for the entry cost. The entire
procedure is repeated for every deﬁned combination in this three dimensional grid. After narrowing
down the possible parameter values I perform a ﬁn e rg r i ds e a r c ht om a k et h ec r i t e r i o nf u n c t i o n
as close as possible to zero. After estimating the parameters, the variance covariance matrix is
calculated at the estimated parameter values. It is important to note that the variance-covariance
matrix is calculated using the boostrapped variance-covariance matrix of the auxiliary parameters so
that precision of the structural estimates takes into account the precision of the auxiliary estimates.
Finally, since the model is overidentiﬁed, an overidentiﬁcation test is also performed.
5R e s u l t s
Three auxiliary regression models are estimated. For identiﬁcation, a heterogeneity corrected probit
is estimated by restricting age coeﬃcients across equations to be the same. Table 4 presents the
auxiliary parameter estimates for linear probability, maximum likelihood probit and heterogeneity
corrected probit models. All models display a signiﬁcant concave age proﬁle even after controlling
for cohort eﬀects and family size. Moreover, lagged participation seems to be a very signiﬁcant
determinant of current participation even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity suggesting
as i g n i ﬁcant "true" structural dependence due to entry cost. Note that the estimated correlation
coeﬃcient across residuals for heterogeneity corrected probit is not statistically signiﬁcant suggesting
that heterogeneity is not a serious problem for this particular sample. For this reason, structural
estimation was performed using only the parameters of the ﬁrst two auxiliary models.
Table 5 reports the results of the SMD estimation of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, the
discount rate and the entry cost to permanent income ratio for the linear probability and maximum
likelihood probit models. The estimates do not seem to be very diﬀerent in magnitude across
auxiliary models. Moreover, all structural parameters are estimated with a remarkable precision for
both auxiliary models. The entry cost is estimated to be approximately 2.1% of annual permanent
income. Zero median participation is matched precisely.
The entry cost estimates are quite small compared to the values used in Haliassos and Michaelides
20(2003). Remember that their work involves experimenting with diﬀerent values of entry cost to
generate nonparticipation. The obvious reason why I am able to generate observed participation
pattern with a much smaller entry cost is that my underlying model is a ﬁnite life model where
agents may not be able to accumulate enough wealth to make it worthwhile to participate in the
stock market over their entire life cycle. Note on the other hand, that in an inﬁnite life setting all
agents eventually participate if the entry cost is not suﬃciently high. In the ﬁnite life case, the
participation decision depends also on the investment horizon. For instance, an agent who is at the
age of T −1 and who never participated before will not ﬁnd it worthwhile to pay the cost and invest
in the stock market for a wide range of wealth. Thus, a tiny entry cost will suﬃce to discourage him.
As investment horizon becomes longer, the magnitude of the cost necessary to deter entry becomes
larger. At the very extreme, inﬁnite life case, the required cost to keep all agents out of the stock
market will naturally be much higher.
The estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion are 1.625 and 1.61 for probit and linear
models respectively. Both estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and perfectly in line with the
previous estimates based on consumption data. Based on an Euler equation estimation, Attanasio
et al (1999) estimate the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to be around 1.5. Among the studies
which perform structural estimation, the estimates of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) range between
0.28 and 2.29, and the estimates of Alan and Browning (2003) range between 1.2 and 1.95.T h e
estimates of Gakidis (1998) however, are somewhat higher (around 3) .T h ed i s c o u n tr a t ee s t i m a t e s
are also reasonable and precise although somewhat higher than the estimates obtained by Alan and
Browning (2003) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
Not surprisingly, both estimations resulted in massive a overidentiﬁcation rejection. Admittedly,
the chi square values are too large to be attributed to approximation error due to discretization and
the inevitable coarseness of the grid search. However, the simulated auxiliary parameters at the
estimated values are very close to their actual data counterparts (see Table 6). This is especially
striking for the structural dependence parameter; estimation using the data yields the value 1.272
while the simulations at the estimated structural parameters result in the value 1.246. The estimated
structural parameters also do a good job in matching the predicted age-participation proﬁle observed
in the data. Figure 3 depicts the simulated and actual predicted age-participation proﬁles for both
21auxiliary models. As shown in the ﬁrst picture, the probit speciﬁcation match is very good for the
early ages. The real success of the model is that given estimated structural parameters, it is able
to generate the observed humped shape age-participation proﬁle and structural dependence in the
data.
The fact that the structural parameters are estimated with a remarkable precision calls for a
discussion of identiﬁcation. It appears that a small change in parameter values results in considerable
changes in simulated proﬁles and structural dependence. Table 6 presents three counterfactual
experiments where each counterfactual represents a small deviation of the structural parameters
from the optimum (i.e., from the actual estimates). For these experiments, I use the baseline
estimates derived from the probit auxiliary model. The experiments involve computing predicted
mean participation at the ages of 30 (early in the life cycle), 45 (about peak participation age) and
59 (just before retirement). The ﬁrst two rows of the table present predicted mean participation
and the structural dependence parameter for the actual data and at the actual structural parameter
estimates respectively. Even though the participation at early ages are well matched, the height of
the predicted age proﬁle is lower than that of the actual data: At the age of 45, estimated mean
participation is .634 while the actual data suggest such value to be .754. The linear model seems to
do better job in capturing the height of the age proﬁle.
In the ﬁrst experiment, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is increased from 1.625 to 1.645.
A higher risk aversion coeﬃcient is expected to push the estimated peak participation. However, as
evident in the table, such a move results in higher early participation and lower structural depen-
dence due to fast wealth accumulation and consequently better aﬀordability of the entry cost; mean
participation at the age of 30 increased from .527 to .534 and structural dependence parameter fell
from 1.246 to 1.235, both further away from the values obtained from the data.
Increasing the discount rate from .0874 to .088 resulted in values that have quite similar interpre-
tation. Higher impatience prevents the early participation and naturally slows down the wealth ac-
cumulation leading to a ﬂatter age-participation proﬁle with higher structural dependence. A higher
structural dependence is the obvious artifact of the low wealth accumulation and consequently a
higher eﬀective entry cost.
The ﬁnal experiment is conducted by increasing entry cost from .0215 to .0225. Not surprisingly,
22a higher entry cost leads to a higher structural dependence parameter (from 1.246 to 1.282). Further-
more, it deters participation in early years leading to slightly lower life cycle wealth accumulation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In the presence of entry costs, stockholding is concentrated at the upper end of the wealth distrib-
ution. Such costs discourage small savers by making stock holding not worthwhile for them. These
are the investors for whom the entry costs exceeds the optimal value of stock investment. With
a small entry cost, these savers are left with only low risk-low return saving tools, such as bank
accounts, money market funds and bonds. Naturally, a reduction in the entry costs would result
in an increase in the number of stockholders, to whom consequently, more consumption smoothing
tools are available. Such an improvement in the capital markets may very well contribute to re-
ducing the need for some public insurance schemes that are designed to help smooth consumption
such as unemployment insurance and publicly provided health insurance. For example, in a recent
paper, Lentz (2003) emphasizes that the optimal unemployment insurance beneﬁt rate in a search
model with savings is quite sensitive to the rate of return on savings. A high rate of return makes
it attractive to hold wealth and hence self-insurance is not as costly.
Going beyond elaborating on their symptoms, knowing the magnitude of entry costs is important
whether their reduction calls for a public policy or if such action should simply be left to publicly
traded corporations and ﬁnancial intermediaries.
In this paper I set up a structural estimation procedure which involves solving and simulating
an intertemporal portfolio choice model augmented with a ﬁxed stock market entry cost. Important
statistics of portfolio data (from the PSID) were matched with their simulated counterparts. The
latter were obtained from the numerical solution of the model. Utilizing a Simulated Minimum
Distance estimator, I estimated the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, the discount factor and the
stock market entry cost. Given the equity premium and the calibrated income process, I estimated an
one-time entry cost of approximately 2 percent of (annual) permanent income. My estimated model
matches the zero median holding as well as the hump-shaped age-participation proﬁle observed in
the data..
Matching participation rate statistics with their simulated counterparts is a challenging task. It
23is well documented that as soon as we start operating under labor income uncertainty, the solution
of the intertemporal model requires numerical methods. Although the solution methods for these
types of models are now standard, tractability can easily disappear with a seemingly small addition
to the model. Adding a participation decision to the problem with two controls (risky and risk-free
asset holdings), one endogenous state variable (cash on hand) and three stochastic state variables
(shocks to risky asset return and shocks to permanent and transitory income) makes the solution
fairly complicated and time consuming.
Clearly, there are several diﬀerent participation costs (whether ﬁxed or variable) that a trader
incurs not only upon entry but also over the course of participation. Brokerage commissions (ﬁxed
and variable) have to be paid every time a transaction takes place. No transaction, whether it is
re-balancing of a portfolio or simply exiting the stock market, is costless. Transaction costs directly
aﬀect the frequency of portfolio re-balancing leading to a structural dependence in the share of stocks
in the ﬁnancial portfolio. This has particularly serious implications for the optimal portfolio of a
small saver who happens to be in the stock market. In the presence of transaction costs, it may not
be worthwhile for him to re-balance his portfolio for a long period of time over the life cycle. In
principle, it is possible to identify ﬁxed transaction costs within the estimation framework used in
this paper. Unfortunately, this additional complication makes the solution of the model even more
time consuming.
Another obvious direction in which to extend this work is the simultaneous modelling of stock
market participation and other aspects of intertemporal allocation behavior: portfolio shares, con-
sumption and wealth levels. As Browning and Crossley (2001) emphasize, a great virtue of the
life-cycle framework is the coherence it brings to thinking about diﬀerent aspects of intertemporal
allocation behavior, and the discipline it demands: it should be possible to reconcile diﬀerent aspects
intertemporal allocation behavior with the same set of parameter values. Because my model is a
essentially a buﬀer stock savings model (impatient agents facing labour income certainty) it cannot
match the wealth distribution. The same is true of the Gourinchas and Parker’s (2002) structural
model of life-cycle consumption proﬁl e s . H o w e v e r ,b e c a u s em ye s t i m a t e so ft h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f -
erence and inter-temporal substitution elasticity are not too dissimilar to Gourinchas and Parker’s
(2002), it seems that it might be possible to reconcile both consumption proﬁles and stock market
24participation proﬁles with a model of the type I have presented. With respect to portfolio shares,
preliminary work suggests that it will only be possible to match the age proﬁle of portfolios shares
with a model of this type if another risk (for example a depression or a calamity risk) is added to
the model. These extensions are left for future research.
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27A Appendix: Solution and Simulation Methods
The standard life cycle model for portfolio choice described in Section 2 is solved via backward
induction by imposing an exogenous illiquid wealth accumulation function at the ﬁnal period T.
Simply, in the last period of working life the policy rule for normalized consumption is
cT = λ0 + λ1xT (28)
In order to solve for the policy rules at T − 1 I discretize the state variable x (cash on hand to
permanent income ratio) by deﬁning an exogenous grid {xj}
J
j=1 j =1 ...50. The control space is also
discretized such that normalized stock holding is {si}
I
i=1 j =1 ...100 and normalized bond holding
is {bj}
I
i=1 i =1 ...100. For the estimation, the borrowing constraint is assumed to be explicit so
I set the lowerbound for cash to 0.1 and upperbound to 10. Since borrowing is not allowed, the
possible range for cash on hand is always positive therefore it is not necessary to adjust the grid
as the solution goes back in time21. For the illustration of the model in Section 2, a positive zero
income probability is assumed and the control space is not discretized.
The algorithm ﬁrst ﬁnds the investment on risky and riskless assets that maximize the value
function for each value in the grid of x. Then, another optimization is performed where the generic
consumer has only risk free asset to invest. Values of both optimizations are compared and the
rule that results in higher value is picked. The value function at T − 1 is the outer envelope of
the two value functions. Since I use a smooth cubic spline to approximate earlier value functions,
nonconvexities due to taking outer envelope of two functions do not pose any numerical diﬃculty.
For illustration of the model, ﬁrst, I generate 10,000 income shocks for 60 years using the
income process described in Section 2. 60 years of returns are generated in the similar fashion. The
probability of zero income shocks is generated using a uniform random number generator. After
generating all the necessary shocks, I simulate life cycle paths of consumption, stock and bond
holding for 10,000 agents and take cross-section averages.
For the estimations, the model is solved given the calibrated income and return processes for
37 years (ages 24 to 60). Using the resulting policy functions and the realized returns simulated
21In genearal, when borrowing is allowed, cash on hand in any given period (except for the last period) can be
negative. It is then crucial to adjust the grid since the possible ranges for cash on hand are diﬀerent at diﬀerent stages
of life. For instance, if one wants to impose a borrowing constraint such that all debt must be paid before death, then
possible lower bound for cash on hand at time T − 1 is minus the minimum possible income realization divided by
gross risk-free rate.
28data for 1294 households are generated. Age composition and the panel structure of the actual data
are exactly replicated in the simulated data. Due to the extreme complexity of the solution of the
underlying model I set the number of simulations to 122.
B Appendix: Asymptotic Distribution of the SMD Estima-
tor





If the model is well-speciﬁed αS(θ) is converges in probability to αD(Yh,X h), αD hereafter. Then,
plimθSMD = θ0 (31)
Assuming the weighting matrix A converges to a non-stochastic matrix













If the model is well speciﬁed the last term disappears. Applying the Central Limit Theorem and



























Note that if S =1 , variance is twice a large as the variance obtained from the analytical solution.




22Eﬃciency gain of and extra simulation is not very large considering the CPU time of each iteration (approximately
20 hours).
29Expanding αS(θ) around θ0 we have
αS(θ)=αS(θ0)+∇αS(θ0)(θ − θ0) (37)
























































So, the optimal weight matrix A = V
−1
0 . Then, the asymptotic distribution of the SMD estimator
which uses a consistent estimator of V
−1
0 as weight matrix is
√
























Discount Rate (δ) 0.1
risk-free rate (r) 0.03
mean excess return on risky asset (µ) 0.06
std of risky asset (σε) 0.20
std of transitory income shocks (σu) 0.14
std of permanent income shocks (σn) 0.0
Fixed entry cost ratio (Ec) 0 and 0.02
probability of zero income 0.01
Retirement function parameters λ0 =0 ,λ 1 =1
Table 1: Parameters for Simulations
Year Full Sample Estimation Sample
1984 #o fo b s e r v a t i o n s 7241 1294
pct. of hh participating 14.8 27.5
median participation 0 0
1989 #o fo b s e r v a t i o n s 5921 1294
pct. of hh participating 17.8 36.4
median participation 0 0
correlation btw 84 and 89 participation .41 .45












Table 3: Variance Decomposition and Growth of Income. Standard erros in parantheses.
31Parameter Probit Linear Heterogeneity
Corrected Probit
constant −3.276 −.708 −8.48
(1.03) (.306) (2.14)
Age .179 .058 .442
(.052) (.015) (.119)
Age2 −0.0024 −.0007 −.006
(.0006) (.0002) (.0016)




Table 4: Auxiliary Estimates from the PSID. Standard errors in parantheses. Right hand size
variables also include 8 cohort dummies (4-year intervals) and family size.
Structural Parameter Auxiliary Model
Probit Linear
Coeﬃcient of RRA (γ) 1.625 1.610
(.1748) (.1911)
Discount Rate (δ) .0874 .0861
(.0069) (.0071)
Entry Cost (Ec - % of Permanent Iincome) .0215 .0210
(.0047) (.0044)
Simulated Median Participation 00
Overidentifying Restriction (χ1) 22.11 17.86







lagged participation 1.246 .460
(.055) (.018)
Table 5: Structural Estimation Results. Standard errors in parantheses.
32Parameter Mean Predicted Coef. on lagged
Participation Participation
γδE c age 30 age 45 age 59
Actual Data .511 .754 .302 1.272
Estimates 1.625 .0874 .0215 .527 .634 .287 1.246
Counterfactual 1 1.645 .534 .642 .282 1.235
Counterfactual 2 .0880 .523 .631 .288 1.267
Counterfactual 3 .0225 .520 .633 .287 1.281
Note: Actual data values are predicted mean participation obtained after the
probit regression of 89 participation on a constant, age, age squared, 84
participation, cohort dummies and family size.
T a b l e6 :S e n s i t i v i t yo fA g eP r o ﬁles and Structural Dependence (Probit Model)
.
33Figure 1: Policy Function Diﬀerences
34Figure 2: Life cycle path diﬀerences
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